GDG- A little clarification please.

CWMHTours at CWMHTours at
Fri Jan 27 09:03:44 CST 2012

Add to that that in just DC and Alexandria this was a huge  supply base.  
The whole area between the White House and Georgetown was  full of 
warehouses.  The Navy Yard was full of supplies.  The  Washington Arsenal- Ft McNair 
was full of supplies.  The whole of  Alexandria was a big quartermaster base 
and all those supplies could be shipped  to Grant overnight. 
A  Loyal Neo-Anti Unionist,

In a message dated 1/27/2012 9:54:47 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,  
dherko at writes:

Esteemed  GDG Member Contributes:
Lee could not have drawn the AoP away from their  supply base by going 

The Union had developed a series of  permanent and temporary supply depots. 
 I did quite a bit of study on  City Point.  Montgomery Meigs was the QM 
General, Ingals was the AoP QM  chief.  As the AoP moved across Virginia 
throughout the war, the War  Department closed and opened temporary depots - city 
point was the best  example.  Permanent depots were just informed by 
telegraph or other means  on how to push supplies and to where they would go.

The greatest  example of Union Supply efficiency was the mail for Sherman's 
Army.   Sherman had not informed the war department on the exact timeand 
place of  where he would emerge at the end of his march.  His troops received 
the  fisrt batch of mail within the week, I think actually four days but 
less than  seven is good enough for arguement's sake.  The Union Supply system 
was  that good.

At Petersburg, if I was a regimental QM, I could request a  set of shoes 
size 16EE.  The request would flow up the chain of command  (QM side) through 
the AoP to Ingals office, as the now Chief of QM for the  Armies Operating 
around Richmond (or whatever title he had).  His  department was operating 
out of the Epp plantation house overlooking the City  Point Warfs.  If the 
clothing warehouses did not have the set of shoes,  the request was passed to 
Meigs HQ in DC, where the request would be sent to  the depot for clothing 
(lets say Boston for instance) if Boston Depot did not  have the 16EE, they 
would contact the manufacturer and several sets of 16EE  shoes were made, sent 
to Boston, forward an intermediate depot if one was  assigned for low 
priority routine deliveries or possibly put on a ship right  to City Point if the 
request was given a higher priority.  Remember City  Point was, during the 
seige, the busiest port in the  world.

Conferderate Soldiers who for months smelled fresh bread being  delivered 
to Union troops at Petersburg were in awe when they were proceessed  through 
City Point as prisoners. 

Again that is Lee not truly  understanding what he was up against.  His men 
were supplying themselves  for two years on Union good (sadlles, blankets, 
weapons, clothing, wagons,  cannon, anything they could pick up)  the supply 
never stopped.  The  wagon train that Stuart captured had 250 brand new 
wagons with brand new bits,  straps, harnesses,  theat stuff was being crated 
at record pace.   

As Lee was running out of serviceable horses, Meade had more than he  could 
use.  Hunt was able to create a secret wagon train filled with  ammunition 
for a big fight.  The corperate Union Army, that was  prosecuting the war 
strategically was light years ahead of the CSA.  Only  Sherman's Army during 
his Georgia was the only Union Army that ever was  completely severed fro the 
Union supply system.  

Don Herko  (US Army Loggie)  

--- Tom Barrett <tbarrett21 at>  wrote: 
> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
> From a  military standpoint, I think he wanted to draw the AoP far enough 
>  that they were separated from their supply and support bases and far  
> that they would be tired, scattered, and not able to  concentrate
> effectively.  Drawing them toward Harrisburg was a  good plan, but 
> them out would have been even better, so the  AoP Corps couldn't quickly
> support one another.
> I  think he figured that his forces would be more rested and better
>  concentrated than the AoP, and that he'd pick off and defeat the Union  
> as they came north.  
> As it turned out,  Gettysburg wasn't far enough, and the AoP was well
> organized, well  supplied, and was able to concentrate effectively.  For
> whatever  reason, Lee chose to attack anyway.
> Regards,
>  TB 
>  ________________________________
>    > 
>  >> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
> >> I tend to favor the  notion that Harrisburg was a decoy to draw Union
> forces out into the  open. I absolutely believe that Lee would have  sent
> forces into  the city, primarily to destroy railroad  infrastructure, 
>  manufacturing operations, capture supplies, and  generally create  
> panic in the north, but holding the city was  never an  option. I believe
> there was a relatively small window of   opportunity for the ANV to 
> in Pennsylvania.
> >>  
> >> On Jan 26, 2012, at 2:13 PM, keith mackenzie wrote:
>  >> 
> >>> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>  >>> I've read a couple of posts where the esteemed member insisted  that 
> did not intend to hold Harrisburg if he did in fact  assault and  take it.
> >>> I don't know if it was more  than one poster or only one several 
> >>> My
>  >>> question is, does anyone think he would have attempted to hold  it? I
> don't think anyone has put forward that POV, but I might have  missed  it.
> >>> thanks
> >>> K.
>  >>>   
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