GDG- ISusquehanna River

Jack Lawrence jlawrence at kc.rr.com
Wed Jan 25 16:37:09 CST 2012


The rub here is the difference between what they where doing and why they 
were doing it.

Lee was going to create mischief as far and wide as possible, whike 
maintaining his lifeline to the Cumberland Valley. He could never slip that 
tether.

Your i terpretation to read "....if the ANV ran into trouble in the form of 
a large number of Union troops, then they could still retreat back across 
the bridge which had been secured to the west bank and onward "to a place of 
safety". acknowledges they were only going to stay until they got bit.
NORTH, CLEARING
Which affirms the real mission here. To create enough trouble  force the AoP 
north.
This was simnply a raid and, once the aoP DID move north, Lee called it off.

Regards,

Jack

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Tom Ryan" <pennmardel at mchsi.com>
To: "GDG" <gettysburg at arthes.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2012 4:25 PM
Subject: Re: GDG- ISusquehanna River


> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
> Just to add a couple of points to what has already been said, further 
> evidence that Lee planned to cross the Susquehanna was Early ordering 
> Gordon to capture the Wrightsville-Columbia Bridge, a few miles northeast 
> of York.  However, PA militia burned the bridge before Gordon could 
> capture it.  This is what Early said about this incident in his report 
> (OR, 27, II, p. 367):
>
> "I regretted very much the failure to secure this bridge, as, finding the 
> defenseless condition of the country generally, and the little obstacle 
> likely to be afforded by the militia to our progress, I had determined, if 
> I could get possession of the Columbia Bridge, to cross my division over 
> the Susquehanna, and cut the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, march upon 
> Lancaster [about 15 miles east of the river], lay that town under 
> contribution, and then attack Harrisburg in the rear while it should be 
> attacked in the front by the rest of the corps...."
>
> This statement seems to give credence to the plan for Lee to send his 
> troops across the Susquehanna, and, at the very least, attack and capture 
> Harrisburg.  It should also be noted that Gordon later wrote that he 
> planned to send a contingent toward Philadelphia, however, there appears 
> to be no way to determine whether this was an exaggeration on his part.
>
> At any rate, Early continues in his report:
>
> "...relying, in the worst contingency that might happen, upon being able 
> to mount my division from the immense number of horses that had been run 
> across the river, and then move to the west, destroying the railroads and 
> canals, and returning back again to a place of safety."
>
> The way I read this last part of his statement is that his division, and 
> by extension the rest of the army, would stay on the east side of the 
> river accomplishing whatever goals General Lee had in mind.  However, if 
> the ANV ran into trouble in the form of a large number of Union troops, 
> then they could still retreat back across the bridge which had been 
> secured to the west bank and onward "to a place of safety."  Those ANV 
> troops further north around Harrisburg would presumably retreat across the 
> river in the same way they forded the river initially.
>
> In addition, when this subject came up on the GDG a while ago, I argued 
> that Lee did not have to rely on a single direction of retreat, 
> specifically retracing his steps back across South Mountain, but could 
> have logically moved south toward Washington and crossed the Potomac in 
> that vicinity.  As I recall there were few, if any, who agreed with this 
> scenario.  But, as I recall, there was no evidence given that this route 
> of march was not feasible for Lee's army to travel.
>
> Regards, Tom Ryan
>
>
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