GDG- Inevitable defeat

[keith mackenzie]

Peter:
Respectfully, I don't think that Dave is offering any of these opinions as his own, but offering a synopsis of an article.
K.
 

"Hello! I'm The Doctor."
(Dr. Who)
 

________________________________
 From: "CWMHTours at aol.com" <CWMHTours at aol.com>
To: gettysburg at arthes.com 
Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 9:28 PM
Subject: Re: GDG- Inevitable defeat
  
Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
Dave,
 
Respectfully Sir,

I think we disagree, sir.

Where is it written that Lee disagreed with Jackson about  destroying 
infrastructure in the North?  I think Lee was just about as  aggressive as 
Jackson was in bringing the war to your opponent. for example,  Antietam, Gtysbg, 
& Monocacy.

I am not dispersing you personally.  I just see Lee &  Jackson as being a 
balanced combination.

By the time of 2nd Man Lee could see the Hammer and the  Anvil.

The Hammer was Jackson.

The Anvil was the wonderful James Peter Longstreet,  the Old Warhorse. 

Also, just curious, I don't recall reference to Lee being  concerned about 
destroying the RR bridge over the Susq. R. being a big concern  of his.  And 
in fact, if you think about it, the damn thing IS still made  of big 
granite blocks. Now just how are you going to knock the darn thing over  without a 
whole lot of valuable time and trouble?  

Lee's 3 raids up north where just  that.  Raids.  Move overwhelming forces 
up north and attack piecemeal  in overwhelming force.

The purpose of going north for Lee was to de-stabilizing the  North.  
Everything else was a subset.

A  Loyal Neo-Anti Unionist,
Peter
 


In a message dated 1/23/2012 8:24:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,  
glory at zbzoom.net writes:

Esteemed  GDG Member Contributes:
Just finished "how the south could have won the  civil war", by Bevin 
Alexander-Armchair General 3-2012

It ends:  
Saddled with leaders like Davis and Lee, who could not perceive reality,  
the South's defeat was inevitable.

The crux of the article is Jackson  understood that the means of war now 
favored the defense as witnessed during  the  7 days battles when only 1 of 
Lee's 5 frontal attacks  succeeded.
Rifled muskets and canister would bleed out the southern army at  this rate.
Instead, Jackson encouraged offensive movement leading to a  defensive 
stance on ground of his choice.
He also favored aggressive  northern invasion with additional plans to 
destroy factories, railroads and  mines.
Both Davis and Lee rejected his strategy. Davis was in favor of a  more 
passive policy hoping the north would tire or Britain/France would  intervene.
Lee favored frontal attacks.

At second manassas,  Jackson's proposals led to an opportunity to destroy 
Pope's army. It may have  worked if Lee would have attacked Popes left 
earlier, failing to prevent  retreat. 
At Antietam, Jackson disagreed with Lee's goal of going to  destroy the  
bridge over the Susquehanna.
Instead he wanted to draw  Mac to attack him north of Washington with added 
goal of destroying factories  etc
When battle took place at Antietam, Lee chose to fight despite little  room 
for maneuver. Jackson's ideals would have favored withdrawing to a more  
favorable defensive position.
At Fredericksburg, Jackson proposed going  south to North Anna River where 
the cavalry would better be able to prevent  the union army's retreat and 
resupply.
At Chancellorsville, Lee put  Jackson's strategy in place. An end around to 
cut off Hookers retreat over the  Rappahannock  at US Ford was foiled by 
Jackson's wound.
Lee invaded  North again but continued his fixation on frontal attacks 
during three costly  days at Gettysburg.

The above are interesting points although over  simplified and without 
primary  sources.

Thoughts?
Dave


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